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Abstract—With the advent of ‘heavy Artificial Intelligence’ – big data, deep learning, and ubiquitous use of the internet, ethical
considerations are widely dealt with in public discussions and governmental bodies. Within Computational Paralinguistics with its
manifold topics and possible applications (modelling of long-term, medium-term, and short-term traits and states such as personality,
emotion, or speech pathology), we have not yet seen that many contributions. In this article, we try to set the scene by (1) giving a
short overview of ethics and privacy, (2) describing the field of Computational Paralinguistics, its history and exemplary use cases, as
well as (de-)anonymisation and peculiarities of speech and text data, and (3) proposing rules for good practice in the field, such as
choosing the right performance measure, and accounting for representativity and interpretability.
Index Terms—Computational Paralinguistics, Good Practice, Ethics, Privacy, (De-)Anonymisation, Representativity, Common Points of
Reference, Interpretability, Measure of Goodness.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
“Quidquid agis prudenter agas et respice finem.”
Whatever you do, follow the rules of good practice and
consider the consequences for individuals and society.
FOR decades, ethics and privacy have not been topicswithin phonetics and linguistics researchers really had
to be aware of; this is in strong contrast to other fields
such as medical sciences or psychology. Most of the time,
there were no institutionalised regulations and committees;
more or less ‘informed’ consent was rather informally given
by participants of studies (experimental subjects) and not
formally required by universities and funding bodies. All
this holds for computer science and engineering as well,
when speech and language had been addressed. Thus,
the remark by Cowie [1] on affective computing can be
extended to phonetics and linguistics, and to speech and
language processing in general as well: “People who work
in affective computing tend to have trained in disciplines
allied to engineering and mathematics. Training in those
areas is unlikely to have included courses on ethics. As a
result, it can come as a shock to discover that ethical issues
are very much part of the discipline that they have come
into ...”; cf. [2] as well.
During the last years, ethics and privacy have been
playing an increasing role in the scientific and societal
discourse, due to both utopic and dystopic visions of new
developments – big data, Internet-of-Things, Deep Neural
Networks (DNN), availability of personal data on the web,
and new possibilities within automatic speech and language
processing. This concern is mirrored in discussions, new
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regulations, and guidelines on all societal levels – EU,
states, funding bodies, universities, departments, and newly
established ethical committees. Yet, there is no consensus on
the good and the bad the new technologies can offer now
and especially in the future. There are claims of startups
that they are able or will be able in the near future to de-
anonymise speakers and to predict – not only diagnose –
pathologies such as Parkinson’s Disease or Attention Deficit
Disorder from yet non-affected speech. This might be as
unlikely as the claims that lie detectors really work [3] but
of course, it is always difficult to prove that black swans
or Yetis do not exist, or to argue that the existence of
some black swans does not mean that you will encounter
them. Consequently, such concerns might find their way
into ethical regulations and have to be counterbalanced by
concerns that research should not be blocked unduly.
In daily life, researchers inevitably get into contact with
ethics when it comes to make a project pass ethical clearance
and to get informed consent from participants in experi-
ments. Taking care of such privacy issues is both inconve-
nient and necessary: inconvenient because it is (at least, has
been) a new requirement; necessary because of all the threats
and fears that are associated with this topic. Yet, ethics does
not only mean privacy but good and responsible research
as well – in our case, research in the field of Computational
Paralinguistics (CP) where we are interested in the (type of)
speech and speaker we are dealing with; cf. Section 3. Note
that there is considerable overlap between CP and affective
computing; cf. Fig. 2 below.
The focus of this contribution is twofold: First, we want
to introduce CP as a field with specific ethical demands
– similar to but not identical with the demands in neigh-
bouring fields. Second, we want to point out requirements
on good practice in CP: Good research is more ethically
defensible than bad research [4], [5], [6]. We concentrate on
aspects of speech and language addressed in CP and not on
generic topics in ethics and privacy.
To start with, we shortly introduce key theories, con-
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cepts, and fields of ethics in Section 2. This is followed by a
definition of CP in Section 3.1, by some exemplary use cases
in Section 3.2, and by the development of CP in Section
3.3, which has direct impact on ethical demands; Section 3.4
deals with (de-)anonymisation of personal information in
speech and text. Section 4 details specific aspects of good
practice in CP, such as representativity, common points of
reference, interpretability, and adequate performance mea-
sures. Section 5 tries to wrap up the different and sometimes
contrasting needs of ethically responsible research and ap-
plications. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.1
2 ETHICS
Here, we want to present theories and concepts in ethics that
are important in the context of CP, following the structure
of Fig. 1. There, groups of ethical theories and concepts are
given in capitals and specific theories in boldface, with ex-
emplifications in italics. Specific fields of ethics are framed.
Grey background characterises general theories; fields that
are put into practice are given with a blue background.
Good practice will be introduced in general terms and
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Fig. 1. Ethics: theory and practice
2.1 Theories of Ethics
Ethics is defined in the Encyclopedia Britannica [9] as
follows: “Ethics, also called MORAL PHILOSOPHY, the dis-
cipline concerned with what is morally good and bad, right
and wrong. The term is also applied to any system or
theory of moral values or principles.” It is not occupied with
factual knowledge but with values, and it is concerned with
practical decisions in many disciplines.
Normative ethics [10] wants to establish standards of
wrong and right behaviours, encoded in one rule or a set of
rules. A well-known rule within Deontological (duty) theo-
ries [11] is Kant’s imperative, given in Fig. 1. This is opposed
to Teleological/Consequentialist theories, Utilitarianism
perhaps being the most pronounced one: Moral rightness
depends only on the consequences (maximising the good
1. This article expands the short contribution of [7] and the small
Section on ‘ethical considerations’ in [8].
and avoiding the bad) [12]. Virtue ethics is the third of the
major approaches in normative ethics; whereas the other
two theories concentrate on rules and consequences, this
theory concentrates on virtue and practical wisdom (char-
acter, moral) [13]. These normative theories have their own
principles but at the same time, they consider characteristics
found in the other theories. The same can be said about
other ethics theories; for example, Care ethics emphasises
“personal interaction and dependency” [14], stresses a fem-
inist perspective, and distinguishes itself from the other
normative theories and the concept of justice. Yet, this might
be considered rather a matter of attaching importance to
different aspects than a fundamental difference.
Applied ethics [15], [16], [17], on the one hand, tries to
formulate rules and principles that are founded in norma-
tive ethics, without necessarily being grounded on and in
line with one of the theories; well-known and influential
are the golden rule (do as you would be done by) [1] and the
four principles in bioethics [18] that are characterised in [19]
as Principalism (also called Principlism [20]): Beneficence
“...implies an obligation to do good for your patient.” Non-
maleficence “...implies a duty to do no harm.” Autonomy
“...implies a duty of non-interference, for example, respect
for the decision-making capacity of an individual even if
the consequences of these decisions are not in their best
interests.” Justice “...is more problematic to define but at
its most basic probably concerns access to health care and
just distribution of healthcare resources.” In [21], justice
encompasses fairness, prevention, mitigation of unwanted
bias, and discrimination. Autonomy is a central concept:
“Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally under-
stood to refer to the capacity to be one’s own person, to live
one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as
one’s own and not the product of manipulative or distorting
external forces.” [22]. On the other hand, applied ethics
branches out into sub-fields – those most relevant for CP
are given in Fig. 1: Computer and information ethics [23],
Internet research ethics [24], Machine/Robot ethics [25],
[26], (Big) Data ethics [27], [28], [29], [30], and Bio-/Medical
ethics [19]. The names of these fields are self-explaining;
common to them is, in the context of CP, that the researcher
somehow deals with other human beings via the computer,
be this by by directly interacting with them, or by collecting
and exploiting personal data.
Theories of normative ethics can be self-consistent; this
is not possible in applied ethics where authors often resort
to common sense [19]. This means as well that, in practice,
we cannot do with a fixed set of rules because we cannot
foresee exactly what future will bring: Anticipatory ethics
[31] has to consider the likely outcome; this can be seen as a
combination of a frequentist perspective (most likely, most
frequent) and a utilitarian perspective (the consequences are
good or bad). We will exemplify such anticipatory consider-
ations in Section 3.2.
Ethics is not yet a ‘regular’ topic within speech research;
in practice, however, every researcher gets into contact
with ethics when it comes to Privacy [32] and by that, to
Ethical Guidelines that have to be followed and Ethical
Committees that have to be passed. These topics will be
addressed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Moreover, practice should
be Good Practice which is part of Professional/Research
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ethics. Practical guidelines for research ethics along the
lines of, e. g., principalism are given in [33]. Good practice
can mean two different, yet closely connected things: on
the one hand, research ethics, on the other hand, simply
doing ‘good, professional science’. All this can be seen as
part of Microethics [34] which is intrinsic to science [7],
[35], whereas general ethical considerations, focusing on
individuals, groups, and society at large, can be seen as
part of Macroethics [34], being extrinsic to science2. Good
practice will be dealt with further below, in Section 4.
2.2 Privacy
In the course of history, the possibilities and by that, the
importance of privacy developed. This was due to, on the
one hand, the spreading of wealth and civilisation – houses
in old times had only one room, and the whole family,
together with guests, often slept in one big bed; cf. the
process of ‘Intimisierung und Privatisierung des Schlafens’
(Intimisation and privatisation of sleeping) from the 16th to
the 19th century [36]. On the other hand, it was a matter
of culture; in ancient Rome, there were public rest rooms.
The privacy as we know it has not been a long established
achievement; it is now threatened by the overall availability
of personal data (in the cloud) and the willingness to give
them away. (Further information can be found in [37] and
[38].) The classic account of privacy is given in [39] where
the authors stress the ‘right to be left alone’. Their introduc-
tory remark is today as relevant as it was in their days: “That
the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has
been found necessary from time to time to define anew the
exact nature and extent of such protection.” This is exactly
the situation we are facing today: Normal is the need to
balance the interests of the public against the interests of
celebrities (royals, film stars, politicians); new is the need to
balance the interest of private persons (i. e., of everybody)
against the interests of companies and society. In both cases,
individuals and groups have to be protected against any
data abuse.
As far as participants in experiments (experimental sub-
jects) and, in a broader sense, human informants are con-
cerned, most important is to preserve their privacy to avoid
any possible harm by giving away their speech, together
with their identity. We will elaborate on the possibilities of
(de-)anonymising speech and text data in Section 3.4; there,
we will argue that for speech data, the risk is lower than in
the case of video data – and this should be taken into ac-
count when establishing ethical regulations. Less important
in CP is the danger of direct physical or emotional/mental
harm as it can be found in clinical studies: A new drug can
cause immediate harm – speech recordings normally do not.
Yet, this could change if we, e. g., employ intrusive methods
for eliciting moods or emotions.
2.3 Ethical Guidelines and Ethical Committees
Scientific bodies, e. g., The American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) [40] or the Association for Computing Machinery
2. “ ‘Microethics’ considers individuals and internal relations of the
engineering profession; ‘macroethics’ applies to the collective social
responsibility of the profession and to societal decisions about tech-
nology.” [34]
(ACM) [41], as well as political institutions, cf. the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union [42], address the
right to privacy and the importance of informed consent.3
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) “on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the process-
ing of personal data” [43], [44] has binding power for the
community starting May 25th, 2018. In [21], Jobin et al. find
a convergence around ethical principles in Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) ethics guidelines, however, with “substantive
divergence” as far as interpretation and implementation are
concerned. A critical evaluation of AI ethics guidelines can
be found in [45].
Stacey and Stacey [46] list the following eight principles
that are “... common to contemporary research ethics pro-
tocols and standards:” (1) informed consent, which implies
the avoidance of covert or secret participant observation; (2)
privacy of participants (confidentiality and anonymity); (3)
avoiding harm (including psychological effect) and doing
good; (4) cognisance of vulnerable groups; (5) participants’
right to withdraw or terminate; (6) restricted use of data;
(7) due care in the storage of data; (8) avoidance of conflicts
of interest. This is a fairly complete catalogue of principles
to be followed; yet, importance differs across disciplines:
As mentioned above, immediate harm is less likely in CP.
Further information on ethical guidelines for related fields
can be found in [47] (counselling and psychotherapy), [48]
(research with children), and in [49], [50], [51] (speech ther-
apy).
Ethical awareness is a moving target and rules of con-
duct are being redefined and refined regularly. Its impor-
tance differs between disciplines, evolved during time, and
has not yet been fully constituted so far: It can be that
universities without medical departments have not yet es-
tablished an Ethics/Ethical Committee (EC), and/or ECs are
still discussing their rules of conduct and adapting them –
more or less in an ad hoc manner – to proposals they have
to evaluate. In other scientific fields, there has been a longer
tradition of ECs and a critical discussion of implications
as well. For instance, for sociological and ethnographic
research, Schrag [52] argues against the ‘ethical imperialism’
in Institutional Review Boards (IRB)4: “... compared to the
problems of medical research, serious social-science abuses
are quite rare”. This is corroborated in [53]: “... although the
possibility of harm to participants in ethnographic research
is real, the probability of harm is very low”. Alternatives
to the traditional IRBs are discussed in [54] and in [55]:
“Chief among these points is the importance and right to
conduct research as a vital element for a democratic society
that values the freedom of expression ...”. Research is, of
course, not foremost the right of a few researchers but its
results can be important and beneficial for society – and all
individuals that are part of this society – as well.
The question of how to handle older databases without
a full-fledged ethical clearance seems to be largely unex-
plored. When will privacy requirements expire and the
3. The URL: http://ethicscodescollection.org/, retrieved
05/07/2020, provides “the largest online repository of ethics codes and
guidelines in the world”.
4. The term EC is used more often in the EU, whereas the term IRB is
more common in the US. Other terms exist as well, e. g., ethical review
board (ERB) or research ethics board (REB).
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data be part of history (sort of copyright agreements), and
most important, which types of data require which types of
privacy rules? For clinical studies, there are established rules
for different types of experimental treatments that might
possibly be more harmful than other types. It seems that
similar distinctions are just about to emerge in humanities




The first hurdle we have to face when defining a scientific
field is that definitions are notoriously fuzzy when it comes
to the border regions separating different fields that might,
at first sight, be unambiguous if we only look at the proto-
typical core area. For us, the problem starts with telling apart
speech from language: partly same or different? We will
use definitions based on the scientific sub-cultures that have
evolved in the course of the last fifty years: Automatic Speech
Processing (ASP) deals with spoken language, Natural Language
Processing (NLP) deals with written language but extends to
spoken language when its linguistics is dealt with. Both
address the question what has been produced, i.e., what has
been spoken or written: phones (underlying: phonemes),
words and sequences of words (n-grams, collocations), or
the semantics behind these words such as keywords, topic
spotting, or ontologies. How something has been spoken –
in which tone of voice, using which prosody, employing
specific words out of several candidates that denote the
same but have different connotations – all this we attribute
to the field of Computational Paralinguistics (CP); ’Automatic’
in ASP and ’Computational’ in CP both simply mean that
the job is done with the help of or by the computer.
Note that extensionally, all these fields have been defined
differently in different sub-cultures as well: Sometimes,
speech processing is seen as a sub-field of language pro-
cessing; sometimes, paralinguistics is confined to non-verbal
aspects of speech, leaving aside verbal/linguistic aspects.
Our motivation to use a rather broad definition of CP is
not to annex as much as possible under this heading, but
simply to mirror daily practice within the computational
approaches towards paralinguistics, or, in other words, to
base our definition on functional (what do we want to find
out) and not formal (which means do we use) aspects [8].
Fig. 2 displays the three vocal/verbal aspects that con-
stitute CP in quadrants I, II, and III. Traditionally, par-
alinguistics encompasses often more than vocal and/or
verbal aspects, cf. the fourth quadrant in Fig. 2. Yet, we
follow the definition in [8] and constrain paralinguistics
to verbal and/or vocal aspects. Thereby, the extensional
definition is unequivocal: Everything belongs to CP that
has been produced by a human5 and can be recorded with
a microphone and/or represented in a written text. The
main topic of CP is not denotation (what we are talking
about) but connotation (how we are taking about it). The
first quadrant in Fig. 2 nonvocal & verbal represents natural
5. Here, we leave aside productions by machines such as avatars or
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Fig. 2. Vocal and verbal aspects of Computational Paralinguistics (blue);
the area of affective computing is indicated by overlaid grey shadowing
language that traditionally is the field of NLP; within CP,
this is the field of opinion mining or sentiment analysis and
of any other area when only written language is analysed.
The second and the third quadrant represent the traditional
fields of paralinguistics, namely vocal aspects that are either
modulated onto or embedded within speech. Vocal & non-
verbal (quadrant III) events such as laughter, filled pauses,
grunts or affect bursts such as grrr, ihh, umpf are embedded
within the speech chain or isolated; they can be modelled
in a similar way as words. In quadrant II, we find vocal &
verbal: for instance, voice quality or intonation modulated
onto or entailed in speech. The choice of different words
for the same denotation with different valence (e. g., lady,
woman, or slut, all denoting [+human], [+adult], [+female])
belongs to verbal, thus, to both quadrants I and II. Auto-
matic speaker identification/verification belongs mostly to
vocal, thus to both quadrants II and III. CP spans across
both Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR)/ASP and NLP,
concentrating on psychological, sociological, and medical
aspects: What characterises the individual, what is typical
for groups and social classes, what tells apart typical from
atypical behaviour?
Non-vocal & non-verbal in quadrant IV stands for all other
modalities such as facial and body gestures, gait, or physio-
signals – and in a broader sense, for every other type of
context. On the one hand, the context modelled by meta-
data of corpora – age, gender, social class, and alike –
belongs to quadrant IV; on the other hand, of course it has
to be taken into account when discussing ethics in CP. Basic
considerations will hold across all modalities; technical solu-
tions, however, might differ. The area of affective computing
is indicated by grey shadowing in Fig. 2; there, we have
to consider ethics both when collecting data and recording
participants in experiments, and when generating (embod-
ied) agents or robots that interact with humans not only
by exchanging information but by exchanging emotions as
well. Ethical issues within affective computing are discussed
in [1], [2], [19], [56], [57], [58], [59].
3.2 Exemplary Use Cases
In this section, we want to present a few exemplary use
cases in CP and sketch relevant ethical considerations. Fig. 3
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attributes these use cases to a layered taxonomy of CP [8]; bi-
ological trait primitives are modified by cultural trait prim-
itives; they all manifest themselves in personality traits and
in short-term emotions as well as in medium-term or long-
term atypicalities or are modified by them. We distinguish
between use cases with primary impact on individuals from
those with primary impact on groups. This is evident in the
case of speaker identification (one individual) vs screening
(a population); yet, there is a smooth transition in the other
cases (e. g., subjects with a specific regional accent can be
classified and stigmatised as group or as individual).
biological trait primitives: 





deviant (atypical) speech: 
    
sexual orientation  
health screening  autistic children 




Fig. 3. Taxonomy of Computational Paralinguistics with exemplary use
cases; adapted from [8] in a simplified version; green: primary impact on
individuals, grey: primary impact on groups
Speaker identification, forensics/court: Speaker identi-
fication, e. g., in court, can be employed the same way as
other evidence; a voice print is, however, not at the same level
of evidence as finger prints or DNA. This might change if
the search space is restricted (the same way as for speaker
verification out of a smaller number of candidates); cf.
below section 3.4. Privacy can be violated, e. g., with secret
recordings at home in the case of divorce proceedings, and
speaker identification can be used, in a dictatorial regime,
for the prosecution of oppositionists.
Voice conversion/forgery: Brundage et al. [60] deal with
“the malicious use of artificial intelligence”. The authors do
not discuss dystopic visions that are projected into the far
future but developments that are likely to emerge in the
next five years or have emerged already. Amongst them is
visual forgery (“... the ability to generate synthetic images,
text, and audio could be used to impersonate others online,
...”) or spear phishing (“... the attacker often posing as one of
the target’s friends, colleagues, or professional contacts.”).
Voice conversion [61] and by that, voice forgery seem to be on
the verge of being technically possible as well and available
to the public. At present, it should still be possible to detect
such a manipulation. This might change in the future and
might lead to some disruption point where both privacy
and anonymity are challenged and at the same time, every
speaker can be imitated close to perfection; it might still be
possible to detect such a voice forgery but it can of course
be very harmful even if its validity can be questioned.
Sexual orientation: This is a highly private issue. Even
if equal rights should have been established, this is not
fully the case in Western societies; moreover, diverse people
(LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) are still pros-
ecuted in some societies. Kosinski et al. and Wang et al.
[62], [63] claim that private traits, including sexual orienta-
tion, can be detected automatically via big data (Facebook,
digitally available images, etc.) with a performance of over
80% correct.6 We do not know of any attempt to do this
employing acoustic information. Yet, studies such as [66],
[67], [68], [69] demonstrate that this could be possible as
well.
Regional accent: This is, in itself, a highly interesting
research topic [70] but its recognition can have more se-
rious consequences than a wrong target pronunciation in
language classes: The prediction of neighbourhood someone
is living in can be used to restrict access to loan, or to decide
upon probabilities that prisoners will re-offend [71].
Assessment centre: Human resources (HR) in big com-
panies already use voice and linguistic cues for personality
testing. At best, this might do no more harm than personal
likes or dislikes of HR officers if used as one amongst
other criteria. Yet, it should be clear that the performance
claimed by companies marketing such products is more
than doubtful and not backed up by scientific evidence [72],
[73], [74].
Call centre: Estimating the length of conversation as a
measure of felicity/success, or estimating the interest of the
caller with the help of audio features, is ethically not critical.
However, trying to detect callers’ anger or personality, or
trying to assess agents’ friendliness might be OK, if anony-
mous, but highly critical, if this information is harnessed for
decisions on employment.
Autistic children: In the ASC project [75], the children
had to look at and listen to actors producing different
emotions, and then, they had to produce these emotions
themselves. Here, what is the criterion for right or wrong? A
real hit, that is, a correspondence with the prototypical acted
emotion? Or the produced emotion can be perceived as such
but is not very pronounced/typical? Or it is rather atypical
and ambiguous but not outright wrong, indicating another,
opposite emotion (happy instead of angry)? And most im-
portant, in the case of erroneous recognition or classification,
when we teach awkward or wrong expressions of emotions,
risks are high that the outcome of such a therapeutic game
is not only irrelevant but outright harmful, leading to social
disintegration. This is an example for applications that are
aimed at individual patients (here: children) with possible
ethically critical impact for these individuals [48], [76].
Health screening: Automatic screening of health state
via voice [77] can be a valuable instrument in the case
of speech therapy; however, we could imagine that health
insurances or employers use it for decisions whether to
admit or employ candidates. This can be unethical, even
if the diagnosis is correct, and it can be disastrous if the
diagnosis is wrong.
Table 1 illustrates that methods themselves are neutral:
They can be harnessed for doing good things or bad things.
Note that ‘bad’ can mean ‘bad if false alarms’ and/or ‘bad if
hits’. The vague specification ‘mostly’ good or bad in Table
1 relates to the fact that, without further specification, we
cannot say that some use is always good or always bad.
When we look at the call centre use case: It might get
6. This study has been heavily criticised [64] for confusing biological
indications with social markers. In fact, the problem is not necessarily
that social proxies (i. e., substitutes, cf. Section 4.2) are employed for
classification but that it is done at all, that possible stigmatisation can
affect both correctly and wrongly classified people, and that physiog-
nomy is taken up again [65].
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TABLE 1
Use Cases: The Good and the Bad
USE-CASE (mostly) GOOD (mostly) BAD
speaker identification, forensics/court criminals (blackmailer, terrorist) divorce proceedings, oppositionist
sexual orientation research de-anonymisation, stigmatisation
voice conversion entertainment fake news, etc.
regional accent pure research acceptance of credit
assessment centre personality scores personality scores
call centre costumer gets angry, action is taken agent is unfriendly and gets dismissed
autistic children social integration social disintegration
health screening early detection of diseases used by insurances, other illegal exploitation
rather common to monitor a user’s emotional state in this
scenario. This can lead to better communication. However,
some users might simply not like this and might object
to such a monitoring. Moreover, harnessing personal traits
(such as emotional behaviour) together with other personal
information might be highly unfavourable for the user. In
the same vein, monitoring the call centre agents’ emotions
can be very helpful for them if this is done in the course of
a training phase but can have bad consequences for them
if it is used to eventually dismiss specific agents because
they ‘cannot control their emotions’. If this is based on a
correct classification, it might violate the agent’s privacy; if
this is based on a wrong classification (false alarm), then
it is wrong per se. Thus, all specifications about ‘good’
or ‘bad’ are based on some basic reasoning (similar to
but not identical with normative rules), followed by some
anticipatory reasoning based on past frequencies (call centre
companies behaved mostly in this or that specific way)
yielding probabilities for future consequences (utilitarian
perspective). Similar constellations can be found for the
other use cases we describe in this section. We will come
back to use cases and applications in Section 5.2.
It seems not to be possible to attribute specific use
cases to certain principles that have to be taken care of
whereas other principles are irrelevant. It is rather more or
less weight that has to be given to specific principles for
specific scenarios. All applications claim to be beneficent
either for a single user or for society. A benefit for society
can imply violating the interests of the individual to some
extent, for instance, when health screening is performed
against the will of the individual. Most important is to
assess the possibilities of maleficence which as well can be
seen as cover term for other principles such as justice: when
justice is violated, we can subsume this under maleficence.
Ethics of care, for instance, is most relevant for vulnerable
groups such as (atypical) children and minority groups.
When individuals are targeted, harm for individuals is in the
fore, and vice versa, when groups are targeted, groups are
in the fore but of course, the individual belonging to such a
group is affected as well. In [78], taxonomies of applications
in speech emotion processing, especially taking into account
ethical awareness, are given.
3.3 Development
ASP looks back at more than fifty years of research [79], [80],
starting with the processing of single digits, produced by
single speakers, in the 1960ies; the lexicon grew from some
1000 entries in the 70ies to several 1000 in the 80ies; trained
dictation in the 90ies was followed by robust processing
of millions of words in the first decade of this century;
the state of the art approaches real-life recognition and
language identification with subsequent automatic trans-
lation. NLP evolved on a similar timeline [81], [82].7 All
this holds for the processing of what has been said: the
chain of words (i. e., word recognition) and the semantics
behind (keywords, topic spotting, hot spots, or ontologies).
Within humanities, what has been said is normally dealt
with within phonetics and linguistics. Now, we address how
something has been said by whom: The term paralinguistics
dates back to the 50ies [8], the field of CP can be traced
back to the recognition/verification/identification of speak-
ers, starting in the 70ies; automatic emotion recognition by
using speech emerged in the 90ies and was subsequently
complemented by classifying/detecting a plethora of long-
term speaker traits (age, height, personality, non-nativeness,
dialect, pathology, etc.), of intermediate traits/states (intox-
ication, sleepiness, etc.), and of short-term states (besides
clear emotions: interest, boredom, even heart rate or eye
contact by using acoustic information, and alike).
We will now sketch the developments within (ASP/NLP
and) CP that led to higher ethical demands:
From what to how: Pure ASP or NLP are interested in
what has been spoken or written; paralinguistics is interested
in how speech or written language have been produced: in
which emotion, by whom (by a non-native, sleepy, intox-
icated, nervous, happy, ... person). It is evident that the
extension from what to how something has been produced
opens new challenges for ethically acceptable approaches.
From basic research to application: Pure speech research
in contrast to clinical studies might be considered to do no
harm as long as the privacy of (experimental) subjects is
guaranteed. Of course, things change if it comes to using
results in political debates or to decisions that have direct or
indirect impact on sub-populations or individuals such as
acceptance or rejection of specific therapies. Applications, on
the other hand, if they are not only entertainment or harm-
less edutainment (in the sense of [57] ’ethically lightweight’),
can have serious impact on individuals.
From typical to atypical: Typicality is a fuzzy and lay-
ered concept [8]: It can mean ’prototypicality’ in the sense
of ’extreme, very pronounced’, thus rather infrequent; it
can mean ’very frequent’ in the sense of ’typical for a spe-
cific (sub-)population’ and thus (mostly) less pronounced.
Moreover, it can mean both. In the context of speech pro-
cessing, ’typical’ often simply means that data are easily
obtainable – in contrast to ’atypical’ ones. Often, a ’typical’
7. Note, however, that this performance is still far from the compe-
tence of a native speaker.
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characteristic is not very interesting for paralinguistics; it
is rather the deviation, the atypicality, which is interesting.
Yet, we always need typical, neutral data (as a sort of back-
ground model) in order to find out what is deviant, atypical.
For ASR, children are atypical because there is still way
more recorded speech data from adult speakers. Within the
groups of children, there are again typical children and
atypical ones, for instance, those with autism condition
or attention deficit disorder, and within these sub-groups,
there are again representative, typical children and those at
the edges of the distribution. Building smaller sub-samples
consisting of people with atypical characteristics is a pre-
stage of personalisation: It is easier to find an individual
out of a small group as opposed to finding an individual
out of a million people. Ethical considerations already start
with the names given to these atypical groups to ensure
politically acceptable (’correct’) terms, cf. ’autism’ vs ’autis-
tic spectrum’ (‘autism disorder’ vs ‘autism condition’) or the
development from ‘coloured’ to ‘negro’ to ‘black’ to ‘African
American’ [83] to ‘people of colour’.
From recognition to analysis: CP systems so far are
mainly tailored to do the recognition job; this means that
they only target the assignment of a label to a speech or
text unit. A very recent and likely future trend, however, is
to go beyond and provide additional analysis, such as the
confidence level or prototypicality, regulation, feigning, dis-
play rules, or atypicality. This can go as far as to the feature
level by analysing which (acoustic or linguistic) feature is
different from the standard case in which way. Such research
strategies might contribute to de-anonymisation as well.
From uni-modal to multi-modal processing: In our
definition of paralinguistics, it is confined to verbal/vocal
(non-verbal) and written phenomena; in a broader sense,
it encompasses other modalities as well, such as facial ex-
pressions, hand/body gestures, and gait. Notwithstanding
this definition, ethical considerations become more impor-
tant when multi-modality comes into the game, simply
because personalisation is easier; thus, anonymisation has
to be stricter: Video processing is more critical as far as
identification of individuals is concerned. Thus, especially
when CP is embedded in multi-modal approaches, ethical
demands are higher.
From small data to big data: Prototypical for a small
data study is an experiment with some 10–50 subjects who
are recruited from the student population, earning credits
for participation, or even from a circle of friends; the par-
ticipants are known beforehand or registered for the study.
Prototypical for a big data study is a very large sample –
from a few hundred to several thousand and more subjects
– obtained from some external source, e. g., from the web
(Facebook, YouTube). These subjects can be known, even
well-known if they are celebrities or, e. g., taking part in
TV discussions, or they can be unknown. Along the same
lines, we can talk of in vitro, lab(-oratory) studies on the one
hand, and in vivo, real-life, ‘in-the-wild’ studies on the other
hand. Typically, the former employ a much smaller number
of subjects than the latter. For small data, most of the time,
anonymisation will be necessary; for big data, most of the
time, de-anonymisation has to be prevented. For both small
and big data, meta-data and meta-information (biological
trait primitives such as age and cultural trait primitives
BASIC RESEARCH    BIG DATA PROCESSING 
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Fig. 4. Anonymisation and De-Anonymisation of Speech Data
such as ethnic/regional background or social class) can
be obtained. Both anonymisation and the prevention of
de-anonymisation are, as far as privacy considerations are
concerned, the most important topics to be dealt with; cf.
Section 3.4. Note that CP mostly still deals with small data
because the phenomena addressed are inherently vague
and have often to be manually annotated by experts in
order to get reliable reference classes, in spite of a plethora
of possible alternatives such as crowd sourcing, transfer
learning, or unsupervised learning.
3.4 Anonymisation and De-anonymisation of Speech
and Text Data
Fig. 4 summarises the topics of this section that are relevant
for both basic research and big data processing, and for
the processing of speech and text in CP: types of data –
small/big, object/meta, and types of information – global
or local. All this is basis and material for the antagonistic
attempts towards anonymisation and de-anonymisation. A
specific aspect is the time line that might make privacy
considerations obsolete when the data are getting part of
(oral) history.
In laboratory experiments employing small data, the indi-
vidual participant is known, his/her identity, however, has
to be concealed in the following processing, especially when
data are passed on to third parties or are made publicly
available. Such basic research, targeted towards specific phe-
nomena, does not necessarily need information on subjects
apart from a broad description of the sample such as age
range, language proficiency, or characteristics of patholog-
ical traits; else, it is enough when data can be identified
unambiguously as belonging to one ’item’ or ’subject’ in
processing. Yet, from a broader perspective, it is advisable to
collect as much individual information as possible – data are
precious and with their help, it might be possible to address
other questions later on. Of course, this conflicts with early
anonymisation.
In big data processing, the identity of the individual is
mostly not immediately apparent but can be discovered. In
NLP, the situation was slightly different but the result was
the same: It “ ... used to involve mostly anonymous corpora,
with the goal of enriching linguistic analysis, and was
therefore unlikely to raise ethical concerns” [84]. The very
same approach of using big anonymous corpora started to
raise these concerns when it was possible to de-anonymise
single persons. Big data can be anonymous or personalised:
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In sentiment analysis, when we ’only’ are interested whether
some specific product or film receives positive or negative
reviews, we do not need any personalised information about
the people behind these reviews. Yet, the temptation to
find out more is high (see the personalised advertisement
in web browsers). In a scan for specific people using big
data procedures, e. g., by national security agencies, per-
sonalisation is a sine qua non, because the disclosure of
individual information provides possibilities to trace back
individuals. When online platforms claim that they only
maintain anonymous records, this does not mean that a
specific person or his browser, computer, network equip-
ment, IP address, or phone cannot be identified: By that,
the platforms can associate observed behaviours with the
record assigned to individual users and tailor their content
and services accordingly. Thus, “...the oxymoronic notion
of an anonymous identifier [is] more accurately labelled a
pseudonym. These identifiers are anonymous only insofar
as they do not depend on traditional categories of identity
while still serving the function of persistent identification.”
[85].
De-individualisation (i. e., removing elements that allow
data to be connected to one specific person) is just one aspect
of anonymisation. Location, gender, age, and other informa-
tion relevant for group membership and thus valuable for
statistical analysis relate to the issue of group privacy. Thus,
anonymisation of data is a matter of degree of how many
and which group attributes remain in the data set. To strip
data from all elements indicating group membership would
mean to strip them from their content. In consequence,
despite of the fact that data are anonymous in the sense
of being de-individualised, groups – and by that, minority
(atypical) groups that are often stigmatised – are always
more transparent [30].
Narayanan and Shmatikov [86] report successful de-
anonymisation attacks “against high-dimensional micro-data,
such as individual preferences, recommendations, transac-
tion records and so on”, applied to the Netflix Prize dataset.
They challenge in [87] the belief held by “... today’s practical
practitioners ... [that] records containing sensitive individual
data can be ‘de-identified’ by removing or modifying PII
[personally identifiable information].”8 All this can lead to
doxing, “... the intentional public release onto the Internet of
personal information about an individual by a third party,
often with the intent to humiliate, threaten, intimidate, or
punish the identified individual ...” with the three types:
“de-anonymization, targeting, and delegitimization.” [90]9.
Although the data are public, no one really imagines to
be the subject of research in Twitter or Facebook studies. Yet,
data are collected from social media without considering
that the lack of informed consent would in any other form
8. “’personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (data subject); an identifiable natural person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to
the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity of that natural person;” [88]; cf. as well [89].
9. “The term ‘doxing’ comes from the phrase ‘dropping documents’
or ‘dropping dox’ on someone, which was a form of revenge in 1990s
outlaw hacker culture that involved uncovering and revealing the
identity of people who fostered anonymity ...” [90]
of research constitute a major breach of research ethics. It
seems that such a procedure is tolerated as long as the data
are not made publicly available – even if they are, e. g.,
from YouTube. Note that here, we speak about present-day
data. It is not clear how old speech/text data have to be
to constitute a sort of oral history (or written history) data
that can be harnessed without any explicit consent from the
speaker/writer, i. e., if we simply can and have to treat them
along copyright regulations. Thus, the time frame we reason-
ably can overlook is an important factor: We have stressed
in Section 1 that the claim that machine learning procedures
can predict speech pathologies for not yet affected, i. e.,
typical speech is not warranted. Young children are a highly
protected group with strong requirements to privacy; after
20 years, however, it will be virtually impossible to induce
the identity of an adult only from the speech produced by
him/her in childhood. We cannot foresee the next centuries
to come. Yet, when we are certain that – if at all – this will
only be possible after several decades, we might reasonably
assume that the speech data can be treated along the lines
of oral history by then.
When researchers really want to be on the safe side, they
have to stop collecting and publishing data. This will not
happen, and it does not make much sense – it would stop
serious science and leave the field to less serious players.
So it means to assess the pros and the cons in each case.
A pivotal aspect will be to weigh costs and benefits: How
expensive is it to de-anonymise, and what can I get out of
it? Thus it is a matter of balancing probabilities: Which risks
do we accept for which benefit [91], [92], [93], [94], [95]?
Now, what about the primary object data within CP? Can
we anonymise speech? And can we de-anonymise speakers
just by analysing their speech – its acoustics and/or its
linguistic content, the latter – if orthographically transcribed
either by hand or by ASR – being more or less the same as
any written record?
The first strategy for anonymising speech databases
aims at globally manipulating acoustic information: Available
might not be the raw speech file but extracted features
(not low level features such as frame-based MFCCs or
pitch but functionals or structured features such as pitch
maximum. Glackin et al. [96] propose symbolic encoding
with an acoustic model on the client’s side, then, the data
are sent encrypted to the server. Lopez et al. [97] claim
that de-identification with frequency warping and ampli-
tude scaling for depressed speech yields “promising de-
identification results at the expense of a slight degradation
of depression detection”. Encryption for privacy-preserving
paralinguistic mining is presented in [98], combined with
Support Vector Machines, for emotion recognition, and in
[99], combined with neural networks, for health-related
tasks. At least DNNs can be fooled by so called ‘adversarial
examples’ (adversarial training) [100], [101], [102] which
have been generated from the speech file by just adding
some noise or altering some samples. The resulting file
cannot be distinguished from the original by humans but
creates serious problems for machine learning (ML). By that,
ML approaches might not be able to de-anonymise based
on speech information. Federate learning [103] distributes
training data over a large number of sites, aiming at a ‘high-
quality centralized model’ [104] without making raw data
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available; yet, it is vulnerable to poisoning attacks [105]. All
these approaches might be suited for specific applications
but not for serious research that simply needs the raw data.
The second strategy for anonymising databases aims at
locally deleting/masking (personal) semantic information: In
text data, extracted terms are replaced with dummy vari-
ables (sanitisation) [106], [107], and in speech data, words or
phrases are masked by beep or noise [108]. By that, ‘meta-
information’ such as names or professions that normally
are given in the meta-data is concealed. Yet, there is still
‘personal information’ denoting the individual speaking or
writing style.
In [109], there is an in-depth discussion of privacy-
preserving technologies in speaker and speech characteri-
sation. An overview of paralinguistic phenomena that can
be employed to obtain personal information in speech, and
of pertinent literature, is given in [110].
Speech is per se more anonymous than video and at the
same time, less attractive for doxing – yet attractive as well
for forgery, e. g., in the case of celebrities. Especially threat-
ened by public shaming (making private recordings public)
are speakers that are not anonymous, such as celebrities
(Royal Highnesses, movie stars); it can be doubted that
this is attractive in the case of atypical speakers displaying
specific traits, for instance, because of (speech) pathologies.
Public shaming commonly employs videos – we do not
know of any case where speech records were used for this
purpose, especially when these speech records were part of
scientific databases and shared with other sites; obviously,
this is a restricted scenario with too many steps to go for
doxing.
Nowadays, speech is believed to be non-anonymous in a
strict sense, not only because it entails personal information,
but because it creates a voice print, the same way as a finger
print. This is a utopic belief. Of course, we can narrow
down alternatives and/or recognise correctly, especially if
meta-data are available. There is another claim that it can
be detected whether ‘normal’, typical speakers will develop
some pathologies in the future. So it will be ‘seemingly
typical but in fact (in future) atypical’ speakers; we doubt
that the machine is able to detect what an expert cannot,
but of course, ML can get better in detecting the transitional
area from typical to pathological. And there is no doubt that
the machine can accomplish time-consuming tasks such as
recordings of babies all night long and for a longer time,
including processing of these recordings, in order to detect
pathologies at an early stage as in the case of the Rett-
syndrome, cf. [111], [112].
Predictions oscillate between realism and utopia, for
speech [110] the same way as for other fields. Yet, we can
resort to empirical facts: if we again reconsider doxing, to its
frequencies based on video or speech or other (meta-) data.
And it is getting more concrete when we consider differ-
ences between types of information entailed in speech data:
Fig. 5 gives an overview of different types of speech data
which display more or less personal information. Typical
adult speakers are represented often in speech databases;
their speech can be recognised best. All other types of
speakers are atypical and not represented that often in
speech databases; their speech cannot be recognised as
easily. However, they might display speech phenomena that
can be attributed to smaller groups of speakers (dialects,
sociolects, age groups, speech impediments). Given that
meta-data are strictly kept confidential (especially the name
of the speaker, of course), recordings of read speech and a
typical adult speaker are ‘most anonymous’; on the other
end, recordings of spontaneous speech where the speakers
talk about themselves and moreover can be attributed to
some specific sub-groups can be considered to be ‘less
anonymous’. Thus, the likeliness that speech data can be
de-anonymised increases from upper left to lower right in
Fig. 5; basically, it is lower for speech data than for other
types of data, especially image and video data.
LESS MEDIUM MORE








atypical ‘sub- (sub-) group’, 
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health state, age, weight, 
height,…; personal 
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Fig. 5. Typology of Speech Data: From less (upper left) to more (lower
right) personal information
4 GOOD PRACTICE IN COMPUTATIONAL PARALIN-
GUISTICS
Good practice in research is a fuzzy concept and used
differently in different scientific fields. It can simply mean to
follow meaningful rules, to document every decision, and to
provide a full account of the data. It can mean to do ethically
responsible research such as taking care of privacy and not
stigmatising minority groups. A good albeit equally fuzzy
definition is: Good practice constitutes good science. Good
science is ethically more acceptable than bad science; yet,
it is more than ‘pure’ ethics. Good practice does not wast
unduly – mostly public – money and it characterises solid
and ‘durable’ research: When, after a generation, an article
is still a good read, then it most likely is good science and
the authors followed the rules of good practice.
Fig. 6 displays a sort of flowchart for good practice in
CP: A necessary prerequisite is an honest attitude such as
no cheating and no plagiarism; this is shortly mentioned
in Section 4.1. To start with, we have to collect the ‘right’,
representative data (Section 4.2). Isolated experiments and
results can be spurious; thus, we need common points of
reference to evaluate our methods (Section 4.3). Measures
and actions differ, depending on our aim: For example, do
we want to detect or treat an individual, or do we want to
screen a population? This is addressed in Section 4.4. The
possibility of interpreting our results is pivotal: If we cannot
do that, we simply do not know why we decide (Section
4.5). And when we communicate our results to colleagues
and to the public, we have to choose metrics that are correct
and can be understood at the same time (Section 4.6). Note
that aiming at the best possible performance could be seen
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as part of good practice as well – it is the Holy Grail in ML.
Yet, a lower performance can be ethically more adequate, if
results can be interpreted or stigmatisation avoided.
Taking into account all these rules constitutes good
practice; yet, in addition, we have to consider both the
interests of individuals, groups, and society. We try to depict
these aspects in Fig. 6 by including the four principles
of Principalism, attributing Autonomy to Privacy, and the
other three Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, and Justice, to
the need of balancing. Privacy and Balancing are not meant
to be two independent ‘ethical modules’10: They are highly
intertwined but told apart. In practice, individual privacy
has to be taken care of simply because research has to
pass ethical clearance. Balancing relates not only to the
individual (for instance, in the role of experimental subject)
but to groups and society at large as well. Note that privacy
preserving research is not necessarily good research in the
sense of good practice that can be seen as intrinsic to science,
with impact on ethics.
Prerequisites: the basics
of responsible research
Choosing the right data:
REPRESENTATIVITY
Keeping data comparable: 
COMMON POINTS OF REFERENCE
Deciding on the aim: 
SINGLE INSTANCE DECISION,
MONITORING, POST HOC ASSESSMENT































































































Fig. 6. Good Practice in Computational Paralinguistics
4.1 Prerequisites: The Basics of Responsible Research
A short remark on the fundamentals of doing good science,
and the basics of releasing software: General principles for
doing good, ethically responsible research are taught in
introductory courses for students and young researchers.
As they should be taken for granted, we only mention them
shortly: full account of data recruitment, no plagiarism (of
other work or of own work), no authorship without substan-
tive own contribution to the work. These general principles
are described in [33], [114]. Guidelines for making available
databases for the scientific community can be found, e. g.,
in [115]. At the other end of the processing chain, the apps
generated, e. g., for monitoring speech pathologies, need be
safe against hacking. This is a very important but rather
technical aspect when the software has been released ‘into
10. Floridi et al., e. g., attribute privacy to non-maleficence [113]. We
put more weight on the autonomy of individuals and their right to
decide even if their choice might be unfavourable for themselves.
the wild’. The same holds for all kinds of personal data
stored in the Web [44], [109].
4.2 Choosing the Right Data: Representativity
Per definition, small samples are never representative; even
larger samples are not representative for ‘human kind’ but
mostly for Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Demo-
cratic (WEIRD) societies [116] and for groups that are more
likely to be used as reservoir for recruiting subjects [117].
Other cultures are broadly underrepresented. Moreover,
large samples can be outdated when used for research –
this is partly unavoidable because it takes a long time to
collect them, cf. [118]: “Many NLP tools for English and
German are based on manually annotated articles from the
Wall Street Journal and Frankfurter Rundschau. The average
readers of these two newspapers are middle-aged (55 and 47
years old, respectively), and the annotated articles are more
than 20 years old by now.” Language itself is mostly not
prone to fast change and does not easily adapt to societal de-
velopment. In the lexicon, adaptation is fastest (neologisms);
examples are the stigmatisation of terms like mongolism
or negro. Morphology (such as generic vs gender-specific
pronouns [119]), however, changes very slowly. Unsuper-
vised, automatic learning represents those stereotypes that
are implicitly entailed in language and speech (skewed
distributions) and thus materialise as prejudices: The world
turns out to be mostly male and white [120].
There are two types of representativity for a sample:
population and phenomenon. Big data wants to approach pop-
ulation by more or less random sampling and large samples.
Representativity is a basic requirement; yet, alone it is not
sufficient. It has to be counterbalanced in case it reinforces
the undesirable status-quo (e. g., repeat offenders are more
often black in present day statistics, therefore, black people
are more often not allowed a day’s leave.) Social class –
and by that, the probability that a loan is repaid, might be
correlated with linguistic markers. The interests of the bank
have to be counterbalanced by the interests of society not to
stigmatise unduly specific social groups. The same holds for
gender matters. Often, the algorithm is then called ‘racist’ or
‘sexist’; yet, it is not the algorithm but the world mirrored by
the algorithm that is biased, and it is the job of the scientists
and ultimately, of society, to take countermeasures.
Our results might be representative for a specific (our
own) culture but not for human kind in general: A nice
example is speaker overlap as an indicator of conflict [121],
[122], [123]; Grezes et al. [124] employ speaker overlap as
a single feature exceeding a baseline for conflict obtained
with 6,373 features [125] by 3% absolute. Yet, this ‘Anglo’
style does not extend to other cultures: In the ‘Latin’ conver-
sational style, overlap indicates interest rather than conflict;
in some Asian cultures (‘Oriental’ style), overlap is impolite
and generally avoided [122], [123]. All these are aspects of
an implicit linguistic imperialism – hard to avoid fully but we
should be aware of the problem.
Most of the time, the phenomenon we are interested in
cannot be seen and modelled directly; we use substitutes
(stand-in data, proxies) instead. The transfer from proxy to
phenomenon is, e. g., more direct when we model non-
native speech: Speech is non-native when it sounds non-
native; there is only one step from non-native speech to
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detect the native language. The transfer is less direct, e. g.,
in the case of regional accent as proxy for neighbourhood
which itself is taken as proxy for differentiating between
good and bad debtors. The less direct the transfer is, the
less reliable might be the modelling. Moreover, there is an
implicit cultural imperialism in taxonomies when proxies are
related to classes, e. g., when bad debtors are attributed
to specific neighbourhoods. In the same vein, when we
annotate according to specific theories, we can find a the-
oretical imperialism: The discrete, big six emotions [126], for
example, representing for some time the prevailing scientific
paradigm [127], somehow prevented other (types of) emo-
tions to be seen in the scientific discourse that are equally
representative [128].
Underestimated is the risk of confounding classes that
have not been modelled: Often, an atypical class – for
instance, people with Parkinson’s Disease – has to be told
apart from a typical class – in this case, people with compa-
rable characteristics without Parkinson’s Disease but with
the same language background, age distribution, and such-
like. When we want to monitor progress, we stick to the very
same class that is already known; there are no confounding
classes. However, when we aim at screening a population
for risk of Parkinson’s Disease, there are many confound-
ing classes: people with diseases that can show similar
speech characteristics – depression, Alzheimer, or speech
pathologies, or people that are ‘goats’ in the terminology
of [129] which cannot be modelled, for unknown reasons.
We might call this the Closed World Fallacy: A classification
performance obtained in experiments with a few controlled
classes cannot be transferred to real life where inevitably,
performance will be (much) lower.
Truth-in-advertising should be obeyed: Summarising
statements such as ‘we can detect/handle/classify X’ are
misleading; we have to explicitly point out how representa-
tive our database is, what this means re prejudices, gender
equality, racism, and stigmatisation in general, how direct
the transfer from proxy to phenomenon is, and whether and
how we take countermeasures to missing representativity.
In this regard, there is no exact measure but we can detail in
a section on caveats. Corbett et al. [130] propose suitable risk
estimates, instead of “(1) anti-classification, meaning that
protected attributes – like race, gender, and their proxies
– are not explicitly used to make decisions; (2) classification
parity, meaning that common measures of predictive per-
formance (e.g., false positive and false negative rates) are
equal across groups defined by the protected attributes; and
(3) calibration, meaning that conditional on risk estimates,
outcomes are independent of protected attributes.” Other
fairness-enhancing interventions are discussed in [131]; a
popular scientific account of discrimination and related
topics in AI is given in [132].
4.3 Keeping Approaches Comparable: Common Points
of Reference
A new approach should be assessed with as many Points
of Reference (POR) as possible. By that we mean standard
‘entities’ such as databases, partitions, feature vectors, pro-
cedures, and performance measures as, for instance, used
in the Computational Paralinguistics ChallengE (ComParE),
organised at Interspeech since 2009 [133]. Only by providing
strict comparability with all other things being equal, we
somehow can assess whether a new approach really is
competitive or even superior. A POR example could be a
publicly available database with a partitioning that it easy
to reproduce, a competitive but at the same time, well-
understood ML procedure such as Support Vector Machines
(SVM), and a straightforward performance measure such as
Unweighted Average Recall (UAR)11 or correlation coefficients.
Only then, we can evaluate the gain a new approach offers.
When a new approach yields (very) good results, em-
ploying new procedures/features and new data, we simply
cannot say whether the data are favourable or something
else. Only when the approach is tested with standard
databases, we will find out. And vice versa, new databases
should be tested with standard procedures such as SVM
and, e. g., a well established feature set such as openSMILE
[137], to give some baseline to compare with. Moreover, we
should evaluate whether our model works equally well not
only for unseen speakers, but also for unseen material.12
The concept of POR extends replicability [140], [141]
in experimental-empirical studies: We not only need strict
replications – which are anyway conceived as being less
attractive in the scientific community – but some sort of
‘weak’ replication along the lines of PORs. Strict replica-
tions account for reliability, weak replications account for
variability and by that, ensure higher robustness. Whereas
representativity focuses on data, replicability focuses on the
comparability of methods as well.
It might be difficult to establish a voluntary ‘culture of
POR’, i. e., to introduce strategies and databases for such
comparisons. We have to make it as comfortable as possible,
and less cumbersome as far as time to invest is concerned,
e. g., by setting up open challenges.
4.4 Deciding on the Aim: Single Instance Decision,
Monitoring, and post hoc Assessment
The assessment of performance in CP and in ASP in general
is mostly ‘context-free’, i. e., the whereabouts of concrete
applications are not considered or only in a very cursory
way. We can be ‘fair’ to all classes we want to model by
using UAR. Yet we can also aim at, e. g., a high rate of
true positives at the cost of increasing the rate of false
positives when we want to reduce the search space for
later processing [134], or a low rate of false positives when
we want to be sure that we can safely interpret our (true)
positives. Moreover, we can try to personalise our models,
i. e., to have a closer look at the performance of individuals.
This will get more important if it comes to applications in
real-life, see Section 5.2.
11. UAR instead of the usual Weighted Average Recall has been
introduced as ‘average of class-wise recognition rates’ [134], to facilitate
a comparison for skewed class distributions; it has been used as a
standard measure in the Computational Paralinguistics Challenges at
Interspeech since 2009 [133], [135]. It is fair towards sparse – i. e., seen
from an ethical point of view, ‘minority’ – classes; moreover, chance
level is known when the number of classes is known (50% for 2 classes,
33.3% for 3 classes, and so on). Note that UAR is sometimes called
‘macro-average’, see [136].
12. This is done implicitly when, e. g., doing cross-corpus classifica-
tion [138] but has to be done explicitly when, e. g., assessing non-native
speech [139].
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TAFFC.2020.3021015
Copyright (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AFFECTIVE COMPUTING 12
The requirements on performance measures differ con-
siderably: In court, the identification of a defendant has to
be perfect; this invalidates lie detectors employing speech,
especially as single and only means. In contrast, when we
evaluate atypical (non-native or pathological) speech, we
only have to approach the performance of an expert panel
or of a single expert – if the benchmark is given by the
situation that only one expert evaluates in daily practice.
This amounts to 100 % correct in court vs a correlation of 0.7
to 0.8 or so for speech assessments [77].
At least, we have to tell apart the following two con-
stellations with clear, prototypical instances or with smooth
transitions between them: Single instance decisions (with in-
stantaneous reaction) must not harm the individual we decide
upon. As mentioned above, this rules out the use of lie
detectors in court. Note that it does not suffice for instan-
taneous reaction that automatic error rate equals human
error rate: We simply do not know whether automatic errors
are of the same weight as human errors. This is due to the
standard procedure: Normally, some – mostly human – an-
notation is trained; by that, we sort of hard-code wrong and
correct labels, and the error rate only gives the frequency
of errors but not whether the actual ones are more or less
serious. To cope with this problem, we needed, e. g., labels
with different weight, depending on their impact in a real
life scenario. The other constellation is Monitoring/Screening
(with delayed reaction and/or global post hoc assessment). In a call
centre scenario, we can immediately react to the recognised
anger of a caller or we can monitor his/her emotions and
delay such a reaction. The first use is a yes/no decision, the
latter one poses less strict demands because we can ‘price
in’ errors, e. g., by using weights or taking into account
confidences, and by considering implications of erroneous
decisions; as for a taxonomy of such applications, cf. [78],
[142].
4.5 Understanding what you did: Interpretability
Amongst the nowadays prevailing ML procedures, the char-
acteristics of especially DNNs is data greediness and opaque-
ness (i. e., missing transparency) [143]. Data greediness is a
practical problem in CP because we cannot simply collect
a huge number of items as is the case for ASR or pictures:
Mostly, we have to annotate our data or use more or less
well-suited proxies; we are often interested in atypical data
and this means in turn that these data are sparse. Data
greediness is a theoretical problem as well because it ham-
pers generalisation and interpretation – in a way, the classes
DNNs recognise are extensionally defined, not intensionally.
Opaqueness hampers interpretation. A rather indirect way
of demonstrating the opaqueness of DNNs is via adversarial
examples (cf. section 3.4) – small manipulations of samples,
not recognisable for humans, lead to a drastic drop in
performance. Adversarial examples for ASR are discussed
in [144], [145], [146], for CP applications, in [100]. A critical
appraisal of DNNs can be found in [147]; interpretability
and explainability of classifiers in general and DNNs in
particular are addressed in [148], [149], [150], [151], [152],
[153].
A specific type of opaqueness is the confusion of cor-
relation with causation in AI: On the one hand, this is an
elementary mistake pointed out in introductory courses in
psychology and other fields; on the other hand, this is not
uncommon in AI, when big data produce – even by chance
– high correlations that do not indicate some causation.
Often, some proxy is employed as ‘real’ indication, e. g., a
specific style of appearance in user groups (social marker) is
interpreted as real indicator of sexual orientation [64].
Missing interpretability/explainability of DNNs is not
only a theoretical problem – it might turn out to be, together
with privacy and other ethical issues, the most important
problem AI will face in the future: In its report on ‘Civil Law
Rules on Robotics’ from 27.1.2017, the European Parliament
recommends a principle of transparency: “... it should al-
ways be possible to supply the rationale behind any decision
taken with the aid of AI that can have a substantive impact
on one or more persons’ lives; considers that it must always
be possible to reduce the AI system’s computations to a form
comprehensible by humans; ...” [154]. Goodman and Flax-
man [155] detail the right to explanation claimed in the EU’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for algorithmic
decisions that impact a user: “Indeed, machine learning
can reify existing patterns of discrimination – if they are
found in the training dataset, then by design an accurate
classifier will reproduce them. In this way, biased decisions
are presented as the outcome of an ‘objective’ algorithm.”
The problem of how to structure the input into the ML
procedure might be solved by appropriate measures to be
taken, such as: balancing the training set, employing appro-
priate measures such as UAR, controlling the (type of) meta-
data that are used, or explicitly biasing the results, e. g., by
using weights. Thus, we can structure – i. e., manipulate for
the better or the worse – the input into the ML procedure
and later on, when looking at the output, re-structure if
needed; this aims at representativity and intrinsic biases and
is possible even if the ML procedure is rather a black box
as in the case of DNNs. The output of ML procedures –
classification or regression/correlation results, i. e., overall
quality, hits, misses, false alarms – should, however, be
interpretable as well.13 Only then, we can decide whether to
employ an ML procedure – especially if it is fully automatic
– in critical situations, e. g., decisions on humans with high
impact, and especially when we not only aim at global but
at single instance decisions. As long as the procedure itself
is a black box, we can relate input to output and gauge with
trial and error; yet, we cannot interpret or even explain the
outcome.
Thus, interpretability can be part of data selection and in-
clusion of meta-data but can be aimed as well at explaining
the features that trigger decisions in classification. Whereas
(meta-)data selection can be seen as a sort of preprocessing,
interpretation of features is at the very heart of paralinguis-
tics [157]. Studies on CP often fall short of explaining and
interpreting results – not only in the case of DNNs where
it, so far, seems to be impossible to do that; but also in
the case of more ‘classic’ ML procedures where different
feature selections could be employed. This might be due as
well to the spurious results of automatic feature selection
procedures with surviving but rather opaque features.
13. Doshi-Velez and Kim [156] define interpretability as “... the ability
to explain or to present in understandable terms to a human”.
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A good POR for interpretability might be an SVM (in-
stead of or complementary to DNNs) together with suited
feature selection procedures such as wrappers; cf. [8, 235ff].
In addition, knowledge-based features should be employed
and assessed as for their performance [157], [158], [159];
this circumvents the problem that automatically selected
features are often less interpretable. Note that as long as
the sparse data problem in CP has not been solved, the
performance of SVM might not be (much) worse than the
one of DNN.14
To make DNNs interpretable is not yet an established
procedure but a topic for research. Yet, we can employ the
same procedures as described in section 4.2.
4.6 Communicating your Results: Measures of Good-
ness and Goodness of Measures
Rosenthal and Blanck [4] stress that science of high quality
is likely to be more ethically defensible; one pivotal aspect
is the goodness of measures that researchers are using as
standard in their scientific sub-culture. There is a notewor-
thy difference between articles in phonetics, socio-/psycho-
linguistics, psychology/sociology, and clinical studies on
the one hand and articles within ASP on the other hand: In
the first sub-cultures, you find papers where only p-values
– the decisive measure in Null Hypothesis Testing (NHT) –
are reported, in the other sub-culture, papers where only
classifications and/or correlations/regressions are reported.
Yet, in both cases, if p-values are small enough (usual
thresholds below 0.05 or 0.001) or classification/regression
high enough, this merits publication and establishing some
theory or model, or claiming a performance that could be
used in some application.
Gigerenzer and Marewski [160] describe the history of
statistical inference and demonstrate how NHT emerged in
the mid 1950ies as institutionalised combination of conflict-
ing theories (Fisher and Neyman-Pearson). NHT as ‘ritual’
prevails until today, although it has been criticised from its
beginning [161], [162]; cf. [160], [163], [164] and references
therein. To mention some of the problems connected with
NHT: p-values are generally not well understood [165]; they
do not tell you that your hypothesis is true but that it is
unlikely to get such a result, given the null hypothesis; they
depend on sample size: large samples can yield significant
results even if the differences are tiny; assumptions such as
normal distribution and random sampling are seldom met;
strict thresholds between ‘true’ and ‘false’ are nonsensical
and in practice, rather employed as entrance ticket for
publication. Twenty years ago, the American Psychologi-
cal Association (APA) recommended to report effect sizes
[166], and eventually, the American Statistical Association
(ASA) published a statement on p-values [167] summarising
all these problems – and of course, different assessments,
concluding: “Good statistical practice, as an essential com-
ponent of good scientific practice, emphasizes principles
of good study design and conduct, a variety of numerical
14. Decision trees are even more interpretable but in our experience,
they fall short in terms of performance. Random Forests are better but
have lost the transparency of single decision trees they exist of. Even if
sometimes, feature interpretation is conducted, error analysis is seldom
found; this might be due to the higher effort needed and/or to missing
expertise.
and graphical summaries of data, understanding of the
phenomenon under study, interpretation of results in con-
text, complete reporting and proper logical and quantitative
understanding of what data summaries mean. No single
index should substitute for scientific reasoning.” Further
suggestions are given in [168].
Thus, instead of (only) reporting p-values, parameter
estimates with confidence intervals and especially effect size
measures should be reported, following sound exploratory
statistics [169]. Effect size measures such as Cohen’s d can
be mapped onto each other [170], [171], and onto the prob-
ability “ ... that you could guess which group a person was
in from knowledge of their ‘score’.” [170]. This last measure
connects to the standard measure of classification (in this
case, to a 2-class problem and UAR). Note that measures
such as UAR give an overall picture; they do not tell us
whether there are sheep, i. e., subjects that can be modelled to
a high extent, or goats, i. e., subjects that cannot be modelled
at all [129], in our sample; to find out, we have to have a
look at the distribution across speakers.
Statistical measures should be understood across sci-
entific sub-cultures; moreover, they should be understood
by laypersons, i. e., in the societal discourse, as well. To
this aim, McGraw and Wong proposed Common Language
Measures that express “... how often a score sampled from
one distribution will be greater than a score sampled from
another distribution ...” [172]. In the same vein, Gigerenzer
et al. [164] propose to describe results not in conditional
probabilities but in natural frequencies – a measure that,
e. g., is often used in societal discussions on the risks of
breast or prostate cancer, or the spread of the coronavirus
pandemic.
Scientific paradigms are like ocean liners: persistent and
slow to change directions. Thus we cannot expect that
phonetics and clinical studies abolish NHT instantaneously
– cf. the recommendation of the APA to employ effect sizes
in 1999 [166] and [171] where it is reported that more than
ten years later, only half of the papers reported effect sizes.
A step-by-step plan could look like this: First, as already
called for by APA in 1999, effect sizes should be given along-
side p-values. Second, argumentation should be based on
effect size measures and not on p-values. CP studies might
employ NHT – sometimes, this is asked for by reviewers
and editors anyway. Effect sizes should be given that can
be understood easily; even if Cohen’s d is well established,
it is not fully optimal because its range of values is not
confined to 0-1. Thus, best would to transform performance
measures to countable entities [164] which are equally easily
understood by other scientific sub-cultures and by society at
large, by that laying a sound basis for the public discourse.
Note that ‘scientifically approved’ measures need not be
abandoned but complemented by suited common language
measures.
5 BALANCING THE NEEDS
5.1 Basic Research
We cannot expect that the rules of good practice described
in Section 4 can always be followed in a strict sense: Full rep-
resentativity is almost impossible to obtain; yet, we have to
be aware, should not make too far reaching conclusions, and
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should point out our limitations. There are no strict points of
reference when we introduce a new database. However, we
always can reason about our aim and about the appropri-
ateness of our measures for different aims. So far, we can
relate these three rules to justice in the sense of Principalism.
The last two rules – interpretability and goodness of measures
– rather relate to autonomy: The ‘layman’ in his/her role as
user or patient should not only give informed consent but be
able to make informed decisions. Overarching are of course
the other rules of applied ethics: beneficience/non-maleficience
and the golden rule, cf. Fig. 1.
Besides taking care of ethically responsible research,
preserving privacy is the most important challenge. An
easy way out of the dilemma not to give away personal
information – including speech data – could simply be not
to give away any data, be this object data (speech samples) or
meta data. This would mirror the ‘old days’, some decades
ago, where such a data exchange was not usual, due to
practical problems (data were stored on tape and transferred
to or mapped onto graphical representations such as spec-
trograms) and due to the wish to keep one’s own ‘property’.
This strategy has changed for the better, and both raw data
and extracted parameters are more and more claimed to be
‘public property’ – especially in the case of projects that
have been publicly funded. This is based on the idea that
resources should not be wasted. It should be added that
both in science and marketing, claims are made that cannot
be validated when the raw data are not available.
The classic approach not to give away infor-
mation was continued in big companies such as
Amazon/Apple/Google/Facebook/Microsoft and Sam-
sung/Huawei who only partly release data or core algo-
rithms. Yet, the research departments of these big compa-
nies at least take part in the scientific discourse, publish
their work, and make some tools available. New and small
enterprises, especially within CP, normally do not release
data or algorithms, and by that, their claims cannot be
scrutinised but only criticised, based on expert knowledge.
Claims as the following are taken at face value: Voice prints
are as good as finger prints, the lie detector works, we can
diagnose your personality, we can predict whether you will
develop Parkinson’s Disease – and all this only by analysing
your speech.
The only possible countermeasure is to make available
data, meta data, and algorithms, e. g., in open challenges
such as the Interspeech Computational Paralinguistics Chal-
lenges ComParE15, MediaEval16, CLEF17, or AVEC18. How-
ever, this automatically means to go over to less strict pri-
vacy politics because of course, there are more possibilities
to violate privacy if more people have access to the data.
This dilemma cannot be solved but only balanced. In a
free society, we cannot ban research, and the public wants
us to do research for the good of society and individuals.
Moreover, at least as far as speech is concerned, we have
not seen (yet!) doxing, based only on speech. Of course, this






Other fields, e. g., clinical studies, have much more elab-
orated demands on informations provided in publications
such as conflicts of interest or documentation of data, and
an established tradition of meta studies.19 Such traditions
could be taken as blueprints for research on CP as well.
5.2 Applications
In basic research, we normally model groups (sub-samples)
out of a larger population, and present some performance
measure; we do not have to decide. In applications – ex-
emplified in the use cases described in Section 3.2, how-
ever, we have to make decisions on individuals or groups
based on the more or less adequate performance obtained.
Common points of reference are not in the fore, and overall
representativity is no longer targeted but has to be granted,
as a prerequisite for a successful – and ethically responsible
– performance. Interpretation is getting more important: In
court, an expert has to motivate and explain his/her re-
sults, e. g., when they claim to have identified a defendant
based on speech recordings. The same will hold for health
screening: Public and parliament have to get explanations
when, e. g., new screening methods should be established
and financed. A good common language measure that can be
communicated and understood by the public is substantial.
Most important might be the complex relationship between
single instance decisions – mostly on individuals – and those
relevant for groups (monitoring/screening) and eventually
the one party that uses such applications: It is always
an individual that gets accepted or rejected as candidate
after personality assessment or after deciding upon regional
accents as indicator of neighbourhood. Thus, we have to aim
at a (personal) individual representativity.
In the long run, good or bad – and this means at the
same time, ethically good or bad – decisions will impact the
company or the agency that employ the tools as well.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
For practitioners, ethics is a thorny topic. This might explain
why there is a large body of work on general ethics within
philosophy but not that many studies on specific fields such
as CP, targeting concrete steps to be taken. The concepts we
introduced for good practice in Section 4 are not unique
to CP; they have been addressed in the general (ethical)
discourse as well – especially representativity and inter-
pretability – and they are or should be topics within (big)
data science [173] and neighbouring fields such as affective
computing. We described them as a sequence of rules to
be followed and exemplified with specific aspects of and
use cases within CP where they have not yet received the
attention they deserve.
Reasoning on ethics is nowadays often confined to
threats to privacy and how to avoid that, especially with
ECs. In this contribution, we wanted as well to shed some
light onto other aspects that are equally important. They
mostly relate to good practice – and by that, quality of
science – and should be addressed in introductory courses
as well. Yet, experience tells us that this is either not done
19. http://www.cochrane.org/.
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properly or it is still worth while to be pointed out. Re-
search strategies are fossilised somehow, as well as scientific
paradigms; yet, there should be some common goals, no
matter how we want to achieve them, such as a common
language measure that is understood by the public, and in
the long run, interpretability of results. As far as privacy is
concerned, matters are different: Privacy is being discussed
at all societal levels and especially addressed in ECs. For
the individual, a full preservation of privacy seems to be
optimal; yet, there are societal reasons – and by that, reasons
that will be manifest for individuals as well – for balancing
the rules of privacy against the needs of society. This does
not mean to undermine unduly the rules of privacy; it
means, however, that we have to gauge benefits and risks
for both individuals and society.
“... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859.
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[115] F. Schönbrodt, M. Gollwitzer, and A. Abele-Brehm, “Der Umgang
mit Forschungsdaten im Fach Psychologie: Konkretisierung der
DFG-Leitlinien,” Psychologische Rundschau, vol. 68, pp. 20–35,
2017.
[116] J. Henrich, S. J. Heine, and A. Norenzayan, “The weirdest people
in the world?” The Behavioral and brain sciences, vol. 33, pp. 61–83;
discussion 83–135, 2010.
[117] R. G. Smart, “Subject selection bias in psychological research,”
Canadian Psychologist, vol. 7a, pp. 115–121, 1966.
[118] D. Hovy and A. Søgaard, “Tagging Performance Correlates with
Author Age,” in Proc. of the 53rd Annual Meeting of ACL-IJCNLP,
Beijing, China, 2015, pp. 483–488.
[119] A. Batliner, “The comprehension of grammatical and natural
gender: a cross-linguistic experiment,” Linguistics, vol. 22, pp.
831–856, 1984.
[120] A. Caliskan, J. J. Bryson, and A. Narayanan, “Semantics de-
rived automatically from language corpora contain human-like
biases,” Science, vol. 356, pp. 183–186, 2017.
[121] K. Hilton, “The Perception of Overlapping Speech: Effects of
Speaker Prosody and Listener Attitudes,” in Proc. of INTER-
SPEECH, San Francisco, CA, 2016, pp. 1260–1264.
[122] F. Trompenaars and C. Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Cul-
ture: Understanding Diversity in Global Business, 2nd ed. McGraw-
Hill Companies, Incorporated, 1998.
[123] H. Fitzgerald, How Different are We? Spoken Discourse in Inter-
cultural Communication. Clevendon, UK: Multilingual Matters,
2003.
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